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abstract: Parental care often increases the survival of offspring,
but it is costly to parents. Because of this trade-off, a sexual conflict
over care arises. The solution to this conflict depends on the inter-
actions between the male and female parents, the behavior of other
animals in the population, and the individual differences within a
sex. We take an integrated approach and develop a state-dependent
dynamic game model of parental care. The model investigates a single
breeding season in which the animals can breed several times. Each
parent’s decision about whether to care for the brood or desert
depends on its own energy reserves, its mate’s reserves, and the time
in the season. We develop a fully consistent solution in which the
behavior of an animal is the best given the behavior of its mate and
of all other animals in the population. The model predicts that fe-
males may strategically reduce their own reserves so as to “force”
their mate to provide care. We investigate how the energy costs of
caring and searching for a mate, values of care (how the probability
of offspring survival depends on the pattern of care), and population
sex ratio influence the pattern of care over the breeding season.
Keywords: sexual conflict, parental care, offspring desertion, dynamic
game, reserves, body mass regulation.
Parental care is an energetically demanding behavior
(Ricklefs 1974; Golet and Irons 1999; Ho˜rak et al. 1999),
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and thus, parents should have sufficient reserves to raise
their young to independence. Parents in poor condition
may terminate care and abandon their nest or young (Sny-
der et al. 1989; Olsson 1997; reviewed by Clutton-Brock
1991; Sze´kely et al. 1996). Given that energy reserves play
an important role in determining patterns of care, an evo-
lutionary account of care should adopt a state-dependent
approach (Houston et al. 1988; Houston and McNamara
1999; Clark and Mangel 2000). State-dependent models
have been developed to investigate the decision of a single
sex by Kelly and Kennedy (1993) and Webb et al. (in press).
For instance, Kelly and Kennedy (1993) showed that fe-
male Cooper’s hawks Accipiter cooperi should desert their
young when their reserves fall below a critical level. In
their model, however, the behavior of deserting females
was constrained by their not allowing the females to re-
mate. In a more general model by Webb et al. (in press),
a deserting female can remate and renest within the same
breeding season. Interestingly, their model found that a
female deserts not only when her reserves are low (and
thus she is threatened by starvation) but also when her
reserves are high. In the latter case, the deserting female
immediately starts to search for a new mate and thus in-
creases her reproductive success by remating.
In many birds, fish, and mammals, however, the payoffs
from caring and deserting not only depend on the envi-
ronment and the energy reserves of the parents but also
on the behavior of other animals in the population. First,
the success of the current breeding attempt depends on
whether the focal animal’s mate cares or deserts. Second,
the operational sex ratio (Emlen and Oring 1977) can
determine the time to remate and hence influence the
payoff from desertion. There is evidence that animals re-
spond to the operational sex ratio. For example, male fish
more often terminate care if the sex ratio is biased toward
females (Keenleyside 1983; Balshine-Earn and Earn 1998),
and female rock sparrows Petronia petronia desert their
brood in years when many unmated males are in the pop-
ulation (Pilastro et al. 2001). These aspects of parental care
require a game-theoretic analysis (Maynard-Smith 1982;
Hammerstein and Parker 1987) in which the behavior of
the focal pair as well as other members of the population
is considered. The importance of including the behavior
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of other members of the population is illustrated by Webb
et al. (1999). They show that modeling the behavior of a
single pair in isolation from the rest of the population
results in different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs)
from ones in which future expectations, including remat-
ing probabilities, depend on the behavior of all members
of the population. Taken together, a full understanding of
parental care requires an analysis that is both state de-
pendent and game theoretic. For a related discussion in
the context of alternative reproductive behaviors, see
Alonzo and Warner (2000).
Here, we develop a state-dependent game model in
which the parents’ decisions depend on their own energy
reserves, their mate’s reserves, and time in the season. The
payoffs for performing each action are not specified in
advance, since they depend on future expectations, which,
in turn, depend on the future behavior of the focal animal
and the behavior (both past and future) of other popu-
lation members. We use the model to show that state-
dependent models can produce very different predictions
from state-independent ones because they allow the ani-
mals to optimize simultaneously their behavior and re-
serves. We then investigate how the energetic costs of var-
ious activities (e.g., parental care, reproduction, mate
search), care parameters, and the population sex ratio in-
fluence parental decisions.
The Model
We consider the behavior of a focal male and a focal female
in a large population of NM males and NF females (Np
) during a breeding season of T d. For simplicity,N NM F
we only describe the behavior of a focal male. If we do
not explicitly specify the female’s behavior, then similar
reasoning applies to her too. For a technical account of
the model, see appendices A and B.
The state of a focal male is represented by his marital
status (unmated or mated), his energy reserves, and, if he
is mated, the energy reserves of his mate. The male dies
of starvation if his reserves fall to zero. However, his re-
serves cannot increase above some maximal level. All
changes in reserves are stochastic.
All animals are unmated when they arrive at the breed-
ing ground. Members of the population arrive gradually
(i.e., on a given day, only a proportion of the whole pop-
ulation arrives). The expected reserves of an arriving in-
dividual may depend on its date of arrival.
The available behavioral actions of a male depend on
his marital status. If a male is unmated at the beginning
of a given day, then he can rest, forage, or search for a
mate during that day. Resting does not change the reserves
of the male, whereas foraging increases his reserves. The
extent of this increase depends on the efficiency of foraging
(i.e., the net energy gained in a day). Searching for a mate
decreases the reserves of the male, but he may find a mate.
The mate-finding probability of a male depends on the
number of mate-searching individuals of both sexes (Webb
et al. 1999). To illustrate this, let us assume that only a
few females are searching for a mate. If only the focal male
searches for females, he will find one with high probability
despite their low numbers. However, if many males search,
the focal male’s probability of finding a mate will be low.
The probability of finding a mate also depends on the
mate-search efficiency k, which may reflect population
density (McNamara et al. 2000). If the focal male finds a
mate, he becomes mated. We assume that mate-finding is
random (i.e., there is no mate choice). As a consequence,
the level of energetic reserves of the mate is drawn from
the distribution of the reserves of the unmated mate-
searching females (i.e., at the time of pair formation, one
member of the pair has no information about the energy
reserves of its partner).
Once a pair has formed, they then produce some off-
spring after a fixed period. For example, in birds, this
period may represent the time required to prepare a nest
or to produce eggs. Producing offspring reduces the re-
serves. This could represent the energetic cost of nest
building, territory defense, or egg laying. We assume that
if the reserves of the male’s mate are not high enough to
cover this cost, then she dies and no offspring are pro-
duced. The male then becomes unmated after the time
period needed for offspring production.
Having produced the offspring, both members of the
pair decide whether to care for the offspring until they
become independent or to desert (i.e., we assume that the
animals decide once for each breeding attempt). We as-
sume that by this time, each parent has been able to ob-
serve the energy reserves of its partner. Thus, when making
decisions, both parents know each others’ reserves exactly.
The male decides first, and the female then decides on the
basis of her partner’s decision. This is a reasonable as-
sumption in internally fertilizing animals such as birds,
mammals, and some fish because the male can leave the
family immediately after fertilization, whereas the female
has to wait to finish offspring production (e.g., laying the
eggs or giving birth). If the male deserts, his reserves re-
main unchanged and he will be unmated at the beginning
of the next day (i.e., he has again the choice of resting,
foraging, or searching for a mate). If the male cares, he
remains with the offspring until they become independent,
or he dies of starvation. Care is costly in terms of both
time (since the caring parent is not available for remating)
and energy. The energetic cost to a parent is, however,
typically less if both parents care for the offspring (cost
of biparental care) than if the parent cares alone (cost of
uniparental care). If a caring parent dies of starvation, we
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Table 1: Parameters of the model and their baseline values
Parameter Symbol Value
Length of the breeding season (d) T 100
Duration of offspring production (d) tl 4
Age of offspring at independence (d) tc 10
Maximum value of reserves L 25
Efficiency of mate search k .3
Value of no care VDD 0
Value of male-only care VCD .7
Value of female-only care VDC .7
Value of biparental care VCC 1
Net energy gain while foraginga xf, M 2
Energetic cost of restinga xr, M 0
Energetic cost of mate searchinga xs, M 1
Energetic cost of offspring productiona x l, M 3
Energetic cost of desertiona xd 0
Energetic cost of biparental carea xc, M(C) 10
Energetic cost of uniparental carea xc, M(D) 12
Dependency of offspring value on reserve h 0
Number of males NM 5,000
Number of females NF 5,000
Median arrival time 6
Note: The sexes are not different under the baseline case, so we give only
the values for the male.
a Variable is set to zero in the reserve-independent scenario.
consider the consequences for the brood to be as if that
parent had not cared at all. For instance, if both parents
decide to care but the female dies during care, then the
brood receives male-only care. In this case, the male’s
reserves decrease by the cost of uniparental care instead
of by the cost of biparental care. Although the conse-
quences of starvation have to be taken into account, we
emphasize that for the parameters used, starvation almost
never occurs.
When the offspring become independent, their contri-
bution to the male’s reproductive value is RAB(x, y, t). We
assume that this reproductive value of offspring depends
on the pattern of care they receive AB, the time in the
breeding season t, and in some cases, the parents’ reserves
x and y. There are four possible patterns of care: no care
(i.e., both parents desert, DD); male-only care (i.e., the
male cares and the female deserts, CD); female-only care
(i.e., the male deserts and the female cares, DC); and bi-
parental care (i.e., both parents care, CC). We are inter-
ested in species in which at least some care is essential for
the offspring to reach independence; therefore, we assume
that the offspring die if both parents desert (i.e.,
). Furthermore, the young typically haveR [x, y, t]p 0DD
their highest reproductive value when they are cared for
by both parents so that , . The effectR ≥ R R ≥ RCC CD DC DD
of uniparental care on the value of offspring is character-
ized by the care parameters (baseline values given in table
1). The offspring’s reproductive value is assumed to de-
crease with time in the season to account for the general
trend in birds that offspring produced late in the season
have lower reproductive success than offspring produced
early (Daan et al. 1989; Sze´kely and Cuthill 1999). In the
baseline case, the reserves of the parents have no effect on
the reproductive value of the young. We also investigate
cases in which the reproductive value of the offspring in-
creases with the reserves of the caring parent(s).
If the male survives until the end of the breeding season,
he receives an additional reward that represents his re-
productive success in future breeding seasons. This ter-
minal reward is taken to be independent of his reserves.
The Desertion Game
We consider a population whose members follow a policy
p. We refer to this policy as the “resident policy” (Mc-
Namara et al. 1997, 2000). Given this policy and some
initial distribution of reserves, we calculate the number of
mate-searching males and females, the distribution of their
reserves, and, consequently, the probability of finding a
mate with given reserves for all days in the breeding season.
On the basis of these distributions, we can determine the
optimal policy for a “mutant” by solving the dynamic
programming equations backward from the end of the
breeding season. We call this optimal policy the “best re-
sponse” B(p) to the resident population strategy p (Mc-
Namara et al. 1997, 2000). A necessary condition for a
strategy to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is∗p
that it is a best response to itself (i.e., ).∗ ∗B[p ]p p
To calculate the ESS, we use a technique commonly
called the “iteration of the best response map.” This starts
with an arbitrary strategy p0 and finds the sequence (p0,
p1, p2, …) of strategies where each strategy is the best
response to the previous strategy in the sequence (i.e.,
). The sequence converges to a limiting strat-B[p ]p pi i1
egy in some cases, but it fails to converge in others.∗p
The problem arises because the best response B(p) does
not change continuously with p. To overcome this diffi-
culty, we use damping and errors in decision making (for
further details, see McNamara et al. 1997). The error is
controlled by the parameter d. When , the animalsdp 0
do not make any errors, whereas with increasing d, the
animals are increasingly unable to differentiate between
actions with similar consequences. We use a small error
( ) that produced the evolutionarily stable so-dp 0.015
lutions in all cases. These stable solutions give the optimal
policies of males and females over the breeding season.
We consider a population in which these policies are used.
Following the population forward in time gives the dis-
tribution of reserves of population members and the pro-
portion of population members taking each action at each
time in the breeding season. (Note this is a forward cal-
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Figure 1: The pattern of parental care over the season. A, Reserve-independent scenario. B, Reserve-dependent scenario: the costs of uni- and
biparental care are identical ( ). C, Reserve-dependent scenario: the costs of care are different ( ; ). Solidbothp 12 uniparentalp 12 biparentalp 5
care; dashed -only care; dotted -only care. Other parameters are as in table 1.linesp biparental linesp female linesp male
culation rather than simulation; see section 3.3 in Houston
and McNamara 1999.) The results presented in the figures
are based on this computational procedure. For a detailed
technical account, see appendix B.
Results
First, we investigate a reserve-independent scenario. In this
scenario, all parameters influencing the animals’ reserves
(e.g., net energy gain or cost of biparental care; see table
1) are set to zero, and other parameters are kept at their
baseline values (table 1). We choose the baseline values
such that they allow us to concentrate on the details of
the game between the parents. For instance, the sexes are
not different from each other, and one parent on its own
is reasonably successful at rearing the offspring. Conse-
quently, a conflict of interest arises between the parents
because it is more beneficial for an animal to desert than
to care, given that its mate will care.
Then we move on to investigate a reserve-dependent
scenario by setting the reserve parameters to the values
given by table 1, except that the costs of both uniparental
and biparental care are 12 units each. Comparison of this
case with the reserve-independent case establishes which
effects in the reserve-dependent scenario are specifically
due to the inclusion of reserves. Finally, we investigate
biologically important questions that have been discussed
in studies of parental care (Clutton-Brock 1991; Sze´kely
et al. 1996) by exploring the effects of changing model
parameters.
Reserve-Independent Scenario
In the reserve-independent case, an oscillation occurs be-
tween female-only and biparental care (fig. 1A). This pat-
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Figure 2: The mean reserves of mated males (solid lines) and females
(dashed lines) over the breeding season. The costs of uni- and biparental
care are (A) identical ( ) and (B) different ( ;bothp 12 uniparentalp 12
). The dotted lines mark the critical levels of reserves.biparentalp 5
tern of care is similar to, and arises for the same reason
as, the one predicted by the non-state-dependent dynamic
game model of McNamara et al. (2000). We only note
here that when female-only care occurs, it is because the
male, who decides first, has “forced” the female to care
by deserting her. For a full analysis, see McNamara et al.
(2000).
Reserve-Dependent Scenario
Restoring the effects of reserves has a major effect on the
pattern of care (fig. 1B). Given that the costs of uni- and
biparental care are the same, male-only care is the most
common form of care even though the male decides first.
Biparental care is frequent only near the end of the breed-
ing season (fig. 1B).
The reason for the difference between the reserve-
independent and the reserve-dependent scenarios is as fol-
lows. In the reserve-independent scenario, the male can
force the female to care by deserting her because he decides
first (McNamara et al. 2000). In the reserve-dependent
scenario, an animal can only raise the young and survive
the period of care if it starts to care with reserves higher
than a critical level (the sum of the cost of parental care
and a safety margin serving as an insurance against the
stochasticity in reserve dynamics). Consequently, in this
case, the male can only force his mate to care by deserting
if the female has reserves higher than her critical level;
otherwise, she also deserts in order to avoid starvation.
Therefore, the inclusion of reserves creates an opportunity
for the female to circumvent the male’s intended behavior
by keeping her reserves below the critical level. If the fe-
male does this, she will have to desert whatever the male
does. Thus, if the young are not to die, the male must
ensure that he has sufficiently high reserves to care. Con-
versely, assume that the male has high reserves. Then, if
the female were to have high reserves, the male would
desert, thus forcing the female to care. It follows that the
female’s best strategy is to have low reserves, thus forcing
the male to care. From this argument, it can be seen that
the pattern of high reserves for the male and low reserves
for the female (see fig. 2A) is evolutionarily stable.
Is it possible that there are other stable patterns; in
particular, could it be stable for a male to have low reserves
and hence force the female to care? If females have high
reserves, then it is optimal for males to exploit this fact
by deserting, so forcing the female to care. (Note the asym-
metry here; the female could not force a male with high
reserves to care because such a male would have deserted
by the time she made her care decision.) But if a male is
going to desert, it is better if he has high reserves. This is
primarily because high reserves mean that he can devote
his time to searching for a mate rather than foraging. We
have already seen, however, that if males have high re-
serves, then it is best for females to have low reserves. It
follows that low reserves for females and high reserves for
males is the unique stable pattern of reserves. The outcome
of this pattern is uniparental care by the male.
Difference between Energetic Costs of
Uni- and Biparental Care
Until now, we have investigated the case in which the
energetic costs of uni- and biparental care are the same.
This may be a reasonable assumption for species with less
demanding young (e.g., birds with precocial chicks). In
contrast, the costs of uni- and biparental care may sig-
nificantly differ in species that have more demanding
young (e.g., birds with altricial chicks). We investigate the
effects of the difference between these costs by keeping the
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cost of uniparental care at its baseline value and decreasing
the cost of biparental care.
When the difference between these costs is small (!5),
then the female can use her strategy of reserve regulation
to force her mate to care; thus, the result is male-only care
during most of the season (results are similar to those
shown in fig. 1B). In contrast, when the difference between
these costs is large, the male can circumvent the female
strategy by keeping his reserves at an intermediate level,
and this results in biparental care (figs. 1C, 2B).
The occurrence of biparental care when the difference
between costs is large can be understood as follows. We
first consider the evolutionarily stable level of reserves for
the female. There are three possibilities. She can have high
reserves (above the level required for uniparental care),
intermediate reserves (below the level for uniparental care
but above the level for biparental care), or low reserves
(below the level for biparental care). Note that a female
with high reserves can care on her own, with intermediate
reserves she can only care together with her mate, whereas
with low reserves she cannot care. Suppose that the female
has high reserves. Then, the best action for the male is to
desert, leaving the female to care. Given that he is going
to desert, it is best for the male to have high reserves. But
then the female should reduce her reserves below the level
for uniparental care, forcing the male to care. Thus, there
can be no ESS in which the female has high reserves. Now,
suppose that the female has low reserves. She then always
deserts whatever the decision of the male. The male is
forced to care in these circumstances, and given this, it is
best if he has high reserves. But the best action of a male
with high reserves is to care not only if the female has low
reserves but also if she has intermediate reserves. So given
this behavior of the male, it is best for the female to have
reserves as high as possible while still forcing the male to
care. Thus, she should have intermediate reserves. It fol-
lows that there is no ESS in which the female has low
reserves; if an ESS exists, the female must have interme-
diate reserves.
What, then, is the stable level of reserves for the male?
In line with the above reasoning, let the female have in-
termediate reserves. The male then has to care. Given this,
he can have high reserves, in which case the female will
desert and he will care on his own, or intermediate re-
serves, in which case the female will be forced to care as
well. Since in the baseline case biparental care is signifi-
cantly better than uniparental care, and he must care what-
ever happens, the male’s best strategy is to have inter-
mediate reserves. The resulting ESS is for both the male
and the female to have intermediate reserves and for both
to care (figs. 1C, 2B).
The male, however, should only reduce his reserves to
intermediate levels when his mate is expected to have in-
termediate levels of reserves. Even if the female attempts
to keep her reserves in this region, she cannot reliably do
so when the critical levels of uniparental and biparental
care are close because of stochasticity in the dynamics of
reserves. This explains why male-only care occurs at small
differences between the costs of uni- and biparental care.
In particular, for the parameter values given in table 1,
the difference in costs is small, and there is male-only care
for much of the season. Since results for these parameters
are very similar to those given in figures 1B and 2A, they
are not shown. When the difference is large, however, the
male can safely reduce his reserves and biparental care is
the result.
Energetic Cost of Reproduction
We manipulated the energetic cost of reproduction (the
sum of energetic costs of offspring production and parental
care) by varying either the cost of offspring production or
the cost of parental care in such a way that the difference
between the costs of uni- and biparental care remains as
in table 1. If the energetic cost of reproduction is signif-
icantly less than the maximal reserves, the female forces
the male to care in the same way as seen previously. If the
cost of reproduction for one sex approaches the maximal
level of reserves, then that sex deserts more often than the
other sex. If an animal’s cost of reproduction exceeds its
maximal level of reserves, then it always deserts.
Energetic Cost of Mate Search
As the energetic cost of mate search increases, a single
individual must spend a greater proportion of time on
foraging. As a consequence, the time needed to find a new
mate increases, so the number of broods produced over
the breeding season decreases (fig. 3A).
We separately investigate symmetric cases (the search
cost is the same for both sexes) and asymmetric cases (the
search cost is different for the sexes). In symmetric cases,
if the search cost is low, the females desert more often
than the males (fig. 3B). This is because the females keep
their reserves low (fig. 3C) to force the males to care. If
the search cost is high, the sexes do not exploit each other
(fig. 3B). Large search cost means that it is more difficult
to maintain high reserves. Hence, the males’ reserves de-
crease (fig. 3C), which in turn makes them less vulnerable
to exploitation by the females. Another consequence of
the low level of reserves is that the frequency of biparental
desertion increases with search cost. The animals do not
know the reserves of their mates in advance, and if the
average level of reserves in the population is low, both
members of the pair are more likely to find themselves
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Figure 3: The effects of mate-search cost. A, The expected number of broods produced during the breeding season plotted against the mate-search
cost of females at different values of mate-search cost of males ( ; ; ; ; ; inverted ).circlep 0 trianglep 1 plusp 2 crossp 3 diamondp 4 trianglep 5
B, The pattern of care plotted against the symmetric (same for both sexes) cost of mate search. Proportion of broods produced over the season
receiving biparental care (circle), female-only care (triangle), and male-only care (plus) is given. C, The mean reserves of mated males (circle) and
females (triangle) plotted against the symmetric mate-search cost. Reserves are averaged over the season. D, The proportion of caring males to all
caring individuals over the season plotted against the difference between the mate-search costs of males and females (average cost of the pair, ca, is
given; circle: ; triangle: ; plus: ; cross: ; diamond: ).c ≤ 1 1 ! c ≤ 2 2 ! c ≤ 3 3 ! c ≤ 4 4 ! ca a a a a
below the critical levels of parental care, which results in
biparental desertion.
In asymmetric cases, the sex with the higher search cost
deserts more often than the sex with lower cost (fig. 3D).
This result is counterintuitive because high search costs
decrease the proportion of time a single animal searches
for a mate and hence increases the time to find a mate.
Thus, high search costs decrease the advantage of deser-
tion. However, in order to be able to care, an animal has
first to raise its reserves above the critical level of parental
care, and a high cost of mate search makes it difficult to
raise reserves and find a new mate at the same time. Con-
sequently, when an animal does mate, its reserves will be
low, and it will be unable to care.
Foraging Efficiency
When the net energy gain while foraging is increased sym-
metrically for each sex, the baseline pattern of care does
not change its qualitative form; male-only care remains
the most common type of care, and biparental care occurs
close to the end of the season. The details of the pattern
of care, however, are changed. Animals start to care earlier
in the season. The frequency of biparental care at the end
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Figure 4: The pattern of care plotted against the values of uniparental care of each sex. Each pie chart shows the proportion of broods that receive
female-only (white), male-only (black), or biparental (grey) care during the breeding season. The frequency of biparental desertion was negligible
in all cases.
of the season increases since it is easier to raise reserves
when there is more food, and, hence, less females are below
the critical level of biparental care at the end of the season.
By changing the net energy gain asymmetrically, the sex
that finds more food always cares. This is because the sex
that is less efficient at foraging takes longer to replenish
the energy spent during care, and, hence, if it was going
to care, it would pay a greater cost in terms of future
matings.
Effects of Care Parameters
When the value of uniparental care by both sexes is low
( ), neither parent can effectively raise theV , V ≤ 0.5CD DC
young on its own so both parents care (fig. 4). Increasing
the value of uniparental care leads to increased temptation
for desertion and increased frequency of uniparental care.
When the increase is symmetric, the female can exploit
the male by keeping her reserves low, and male-only care
is the result (fig. 4). When the increase in care parameters
is asymmetric, the sex that raises the young less effectively
on its own will desert (fig. 4). These results are in accor-
dance with those of McNamara et al. (2000), except that
in symmetric cases, they found female-only care when each
sex can raise the young effectively on its own.
Search Efficiency and Population Sex Ratio
Increasing search efficiency, k, has a major effect on the
pattern of care (fig. 5A). When search efficiency is low
(i.e., it is very difficult to find a new mate), the most
common form of care is biparental. When the search ef-
ficiency increases, the pattern of care changes dramatically;
the frequency of deserting females increases, and male-
only care is observed. The reason for this change is the
strategic reserve regulation by females; when the payoff
from desertion increases, the females reduce their reserves
and force the males to care (fig. 5B).
The effects of population sex ratio NM : NF depend on
the search efficiency. When the search efficiency is low,
the sex ratio has no effect on the pattern of care (fig. 6A)
since desertion is not beneficial even at very extreme sex
ratios (NM : : 1 or 1 : 3). When the search efficiencyN p 3F
is high, the payoff from desertion increases. The propor-
tion of male-only care increases, whereas the proportion
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Figure 5: The effects of search efficiency k. A, The proportion of broods receiving biparental (circle), female-only (triangle), and male-only (plus)
care. B, The mean reserves of males (circle) and females (triangle).
of female-only and biparental care decreases as the sex
ratio shifts from female biased to male biased (fig. 6B).
This result agrees with previous models (e.g., Maynard
Smith 1977; McNamara et al. 2000). Unlike these models,
however, in our model, even in a strongly female-biased
(NM : : 3) population, male-only care is more com-N p 1F
mon than female-only care. This result arises because the
strategic reserve regulation by females overcomes the effect
of sex ratio.
Value of Brood Depends on Parental Reserves
So far, we have assumed that the value of the brood is
independent of parental reserves. One can argue, however,
that parents with high reserves can provide better care
than parents with low reserves. We investigate this pos-
sibility by letting brood reproductive values increase with
parental reserves (see app. B). If the reproductive value of
the offspring depends strongly on the reserves of the caring
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Figure 6: The effects of population sex ratio NM : NF when the searching
efficiency is (A) low ( ) and (B) high ( ). For symbols, seekp 0.1 kp 0.7
figure 5A.
Figure 7: The effects of the dependency h of offspring value on the
reserves of the parent(s). If , the brood reproductive value doeshp 0
not depend on the parental reserves. As h increases, the value of having
high reserves increases. A, The proportion of broods receiving biparental
(circle), female-only (triangle), and male-only (plus) care. B, The mean
reserves of males (circle) and females (triangle).
parent(s) ( ), biparental care is the most commonh 1 0.2
form of care during the season (fig. 7A). The reason for
this result is that strong reserve dependence leads to the
elimination of strategic reserve regulation, as shown by
the increasing reserves of females with reserve dependence
(fig. 7B), since by strategically reducing the reserves, the
parents pay a cost in terms of reduced brood value. If the
dependence is weak ( ), females still use regulationh ≤ 0.2
of reserves to force the males to care.
Discussion
Our state-dependent dynamic game model shows that the
strategic regulation of body mass can have important ef-
fects on the solution of sexual conflict over parental care.
When reserves are not included in our model, members
of the sex deciding first (labeled as males) force the mem-
bers of the other sex (labeled as females) to care by de-
serting. In contrast, when the reserves have effects and the
difference between the costs of uni- and biparental care is
small, the female circumvents the intended behavior of
the male by keeping her energy reserves low. Thus, even
though the male decides first, he cares instead of deserting.
Furthermore, when the difference between the costs is
large, each sex avoids being exploited by keeping its re-
serves between the level required for biparental care and
the level required for uniparental care. This is a novel form
of strategic body mass regulation that arises only in a
game-theoretic context (i.e., animals reduce their reserves
in order to manipulate their mate’s behavior). Previous
studies of strategic body mass regulation focused on single
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individuals and investigated the various costs (e.g., in-
creased predation hazard) and benefits of carrying fat (re-
viewed by Witter and Cuthill 1993; Cuthill and Houston
1997).
A threat must be credible in order to settle a conflict
between animals. For example, imagine a male and female
deciding about whether to care or desert as in our model.
Suppose that the energetic costs of care can be ignored,
and it is more beneficial for an animal to desert than to
care, given that its mate will care. Then a pair of mutual
best responses, that is, a Nash equilibrium, is for the male
(who decides first) to care and the female (who decides
second) to desert whatever the male decides. In this case,
the female is forcing the male to care by means of the
threat of desertion even if the male deserts. Although these
strategies are a Nash equilibrium, they are not evolution-
arily stable (Houston and McNamara 1999). Consider the
alternative female strategy: desert if the male cares and
care if the male deserts. Given that the male always cares,
this strategy for the female has exactly the same payoff as
always deserting. It follows that this alternative strategy
can increase by random drift (cf. Selten 1980). Further-
more, if males make mistakes and desert (or do not care
because, unknown to the female, they have been killed),
then the alternative strategy is strictly better for the female.
For these reasons, the alternative strategy can be expected
to increase in the population up to a level at which it
becomes better for males to exploit this strategy by de-
serting (Houston and McNamara 1999). Thus, in evolu-
tionary terms, the threat of desertion by the female even
if the male deserts is not credible. Once reserves are in-
cluded, the above argument no longer holds. If a female
keeps her reserves below the level required for uniparental
care, then her best action when deserted is also to desert.
It follows that the threat of desertion by a female with low
reserves is now credible. As a result, there is an evolu-
tionarily stable solution in which the female forces the
male to care by keeping her reserves low.
Many birds often lose mass during breeding (re-
viewed by Moreno 1989). This change is traditionally
interpreted as either a sign of stress (Ricklefs 1974; Nur
1984) or an adaptation to increase flight efficiency dur-
ing a demanding period of brood rearing (Freed 1981;
Norberg 1981; Houston 1993; Hillstro¨m 1995). Our
model raises the possibility of a novel explanation for
this mass loss; the parents lose mass to manipulate their
mate’s behavior. If this explanation is correct, we might
expect that a female would increase her level of reserves
when her mate is removed. In our current model, there
is only a single decision per breeding attempt, so such
an effect cannot be predicted. In reality, birds are likely
to make a sequence of state- and time-dependent de-
cisions. Further theoretical work is necessary to estab-
lish the implications of using mass loss to generate cred-
ible threats in a realistic context.
It is widely accepted that the ability of one parent to
raise the young limits the possible patterns of care (Lack
1968; Temrin and Tullberg 1995). For instance, if a sin-
gle parent is able to provide appropriate care for the
offspring, then uniparental care is expected. It has been
found, however, that in many species with biparental
care, one parent can raise the young nearly as success-
fully as both parents (Bart and Tornes 1989; Wolf et al.
1990; Liker 1995). Interestingly, our model predicts
that, despite the fact that one of the parents can raise
the young efficiently, the pattern of care can still be
biparental if the difference between the costs of uni-
and biparental care is large. Then both sexes can avoid
being deserted by keeping their reserves at an inter-
mediate level.
Our model reveals that, as a consequence of the ef-
fects of reserves, the parameters that influence reserves
before mating (e.g., foraging efficiency, cost of mate
search) can have a large effect on the pattern of parental
care. In general, the sex that can improve its reserves
more efficiently or pay less energetic cost will care. This
emphasizes that one cannot investigate the behavior of
unmated or mated individuals in isolation from each
other (Webb et al., in press).
It could be argued that three of our assumptions may
limit the generality of the results on strategic regulation
of body mass. First, we assume that each animal knows
exactly the reserves of its mate. This expectation is prob-
ably unrealistic, especially in cases when the male and
female interact only briefly. Note, however, that the level
of reserves is set while the individuals are unmated (i.e.,
before they mate). Therefore, the male’s behavior can
be an evolutionary response to the female’s expected
low reserves (and vice versa), in which case it is un-
necessary to assume that the pair members should be
aware of each other’s reserves. Consequently, the as-
sumption that mated animals know each other’s re-
serves exactly in our model may not have a crucial effect
on the results. Our second assumption is that an animal
must have reserves higher than a certain limit before
breeding in order to breed successfully. Stearns (1992)
defines a capital breeder to be an organism that uses
stored energy for reproduction and an income breeder
to be an organism that uses energy that it obtains during
the reproductive period rather than stored energy for
reproduction. Our model applies to capital breeders. It
does not apply to a pure income breeder in which en-
ergy reserves at the start of reproduction make no con-
tribution. This pure form of income breeding may be
rare. There is a continuum of breeding patterns from
pure capital breeding to pure income breeding (Thomas
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1989; Stearns 1992). Our model applies to forms of
breeding along this continuum provided that for low
reserves, income is not enough to cover costs, so that
individuals whose reserves are sufficiently low at the
beginning of care are likely to starve during care. We
emphasize that the existence of a critical level of reserves
does not mean that offspring desertion due to low re-
serves can be observed frequently in nature since ani-
mals follow policies that make such desertion unlikely.
The third assumption is that mate choice is random. It
might be suggested that a female can use strategic body
mass regulation if the male does not know the reserves
of his prospective mate at the time of pair formation.
If, however, the male knew the reserves of his future
partner, he could potentially avoid mating with a female
with low reserves. Therefore, in a population of choosy
males, females should have high reserves. If all females
have high reserves, however, it is no longer worth
choosing among females especially if choosiness incurs
a nonzero cost. Consequently, nonchoosy males can
spread into the population, creating an opportunity for
the females to use strategic body mass regulation.
Therefore, the population of choosy males and females
with high reserves cannot be stable, so mate choice may
not prevent the use of strategic body mass regulation.
Further theoretical work is needed, however, to explore
the detailed effects of the role of information and the
inclusion of mate choice in our model.
A consequence of random mate choice is that bipar-
ental desertion occurs, especially when the average level
of reserves in the population is low. In this case, the
individuals do not know the reserves of their prospec-
tive partner, and hence, it may turn out that neither
parent can cover the cost of care, which in turn leads
to biparental desertion. Similarly, Webb et al. (1999)
find that uncertainty about the quality of a partner can
result in biparental desertion.
Strategic regulation of reserves has far-reaching con-
sequences in our model. For instance, there is more
desertion by females than by males even in a population
with a strongly female-biased sex ratio. Consequently,
our model predicts male-only care for a large parameter
space. This prediction is different from the empirical
findings that female-only care is more common than
male-only care in most animals (Clutton-Brock 1991).
We suggest a number of reasons for this discrepancy.
First, the sexes are typically more asymmetric in nature
than we assume during the computations. For instance,
males often have higher costs of mate search than fe-
males. Also, care by the female may be much more
beneficial to the young than care by the male (e.g.,
lactation in mammals). For these asymmetric cases, the
model predicts female-only care. In addition, our model
has no scope for males to monopolize access to groups
of females.
Details of the decision process may also influence our
results. First, we assume that the male decides first. In
nature, the opposite can also hold (i.e., the female de-
cides first). For instance, in externally fertilizing animals
such as many fish and amphibians, the female releases
the gametes first (Dawkins and Carlisle 1976). Second,
we assume that the pair decides about care only once
during a breeding attempt. In reality, the decision pro-
cess is probably more complicated; it may involve a
series of interactions between the male and female.
Therefore, the final outcome (i.e., the observed pattern
of care) can be the result of this prolonged negotiation
process. For instance, in the Kentish plover Charadrius
alexandrinus, the parents alternate care of the brood
until one parent deserts. These shifts may be part of
the negotiation process in which the parents test their
own abilities to attract a new mate and renest as well
as testing the ability of their mate to care for the brood
unassisted (T. Sze´kely, personal observation). The ef-
fects of these repeated interactions on the pattern of
care, however, are not known. It is possible that when
the caring and deserting decisions are the results of a
long process (e.g., one that lasts for the whole breeding
attempt), the caring female can use the strategic body
mass regulation to ensure that her mate does not desert.
These arguments emphasize that the decision process
itself requires detailed future theoretical and empirical
studies.
To conclude, our model predicts that strategic reg-
ulation of body mass has an important role in the so-
lution of sexual conflict in parental care. A fundamental
effect of reserves is that they allow animals to make
credible threats.
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APPENDIX A
Basics
State Variables and Their Dynamics
The state of a focal male at time t is represented by his marital status mM(t), the level of his energy reserves XM(t),
and, if he is mated, the energy reserves of his mate YM(t). A male can be either unmated, , or mated,m (t)p 0M
. The male’s energy reserves XM(t) take integer values between 0 and L. The male dies of starvation if itsm (t)p 1M
reserves fall to zero. Any energy that would raise reserves above L is lost. The same constraints apply to the energy
level of the male’s mate YM(t). In defining the dynamics of reserves, we use the truncation function chop(x)p
(Mangel and Clark 1988).max [0, min (L, x)]
An unmated male chooses between resting, foraging, or searching for mate. A mated male must either care or desert
once the young have been produced. If a male with reserves x on day t rests, then his reserves become X (t 1)pM
, , with probability Pi, where , and . If the male forages,chop(x x  z ) x ≥ 0 P p {0.25, 0.5, 0.25} z p {1, 0, 1}r, M i r, M i i
then his energy reserves increase; with probability Pi, where and Pi are defined asX (t 1)p chop(x x  z ) zM f, M i i
above. One can consider xf, M the net energy gain during a day; this gain can depend on either the foraging efficiency
of the male or the food abundance in the environment. Resting and foraging animals remain unmated (i.e.,
).m [t 1]p m [t]p 0M M
If a male decides to search for a mate on day t, then his marital status will be (mate found), withm (t 1)p 1M
probability PM(t) (defined by eq. [A4]), and (mate not found), with probability . If a malem (t 1)p 0 1 P (t)M M
does not find a mate, then his reserves are , with probability Pi. If he does find a mate,X (t 1)p chop(x x  z )M s, M i
then the pair produce offspring after tl d, and his reserves at this time will be ,X (t t  1)p chop(x x  z )M l l, M i
with probability Pi. Under the assumption of random mating, the reserves of the male’s mate is given by the probability
distribution of reserves of unmated, mate-searching females: , with probabilityY (t t  1)p chop(x x  z )M l l, F i
, where gives the probability that a mate-searching female has reserves x at time t :PP (x, t) P (x, t)i search, F search, F
P (x, 0, t)p (x, t)F search, FP (x, t)p , (A1)Lsearch, F  P (x, 0, t)p (x, t)F search, F
xp1
where PF(x, 0, t) gives the probability that a female is unmated and has reserves x on day t while is thep (x, t)search, F
probability that an unmated female with reserves x on day t searches for a mate. This latter probability is derived
from the females’ optimal policy pF (see below). If the male’s mate died because of starvation during the laying period
(i.e., ), then no brood is produced, and the male becomes unmated at the end of the laying periodY [t t  1]p 0M l
(i.e., ).m [t t  1]p 0M l
After finishing offspring production on day t, both members of the pair decide whether to desert or care for the
offspring until their independence. An individual who deserts becomes independent ( ), and its reservesm[t 1]p 0
are decreased by , , with probability Pi.x  z x ≥ 0d i d
If a male decides to care for his offspring, then he does so until they become independent after tc d. Care of the
young is energetically costly, and the male’s reserves at the end of care are ,X (t t  1)p chop[x x (A) z ]M c c, M i
with probability Pi. The extent of the cost of care depends on whether the mate of the focal male cares ( ,Ap C
biparental care) or deserts ( , uniparental care). Uniparental care may cost more than biparental care (i.e.,Ap D
). Caring for young leads to the production of independent offspring after time when thex [D] ≥ x [C] t t  1c, M c, M c
caring male becomes unmated; .m (t t  1)p 0M c
Arrival
All males (as well as females) are unmated when they arrive at the breeding ground. The proportion of males arriving
on day t, G(t), is given by
a 1 l tM MG(t)p (t 1) e . (A2)
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This distribution is normalized so that . The approximate mean of G(t) is aM/lM, while its approximate
T1 G(t)p 1tp0
variance is aM/l
2
M.
The reserves of males that arrive on day t are distributed approximately as a normal distribution with mean, mM(t),
and standard deviation, jM. The arriving males’ mean reserves depend on t as follows:
m (t)p A  B t. (A3)M M M
A similar equation applies to the arriving females. In all of our computations, ; ;a ,a p 2 l ,l p 0.25 j , j pM F M F M F
; ; and .5 A , A p 5 B , B p 0M F M F
Probability of Finding a Mate
We assume that the probability that a male finds a mate is given by the following function
N (t) N (t)F FP (t)p k , (A4)M N (t)N (t) NM F
where NM(t) is the number of males searching for females, NF(t) is the number of searching females, N is the population
size, and k is the efficiency of searching, (McNamara et al. 2000). The values of NM(t) and NF(t) are calculated0 ! k ≤ 1
from the distributions of state variables (reserves and marital status) and the optimal strategy of each sex: N (t)pM
, where is the number of males currently in the breeding area, PM(x, m, t) is the
′ ′LN  [P (x, 0, t)p (x, t)] Nxp1M M search, M M
probability that a male following the optimal strategy has energetic level x and marital status m at time t, and
psearch, M(x, t) is the probability of searching for a female. Similar equations apply to the females.
APPENDIX B
The Game
Reproductive Value of the Brood
We consider the reproductive value of the brood to have two components, the first of which representsR (x , x , t)AB M F
the effects of care and parental reserves , while the second one corresponds to the seasonal effects S(t):r (x , x )AB M F
R (x , x , t)p r (x , x )S(t), (B1)AB M F AB M F
where AB specifies the pattern of care (see “The Model”), while and give the reserves of the caring male andx xM F
female, respectively, at the end of the caring period. If a parent does not care, we set its reserves to zero in the above
equation. This notation also allows us to incorporate easily the effect of the death of one or both parents occurring
during care. The effect of care and parental reserves is modeled as follows.
If both parents desert, then the young certainly die:
r (0, 0)p 0. (B2)DD
When only the male cares, the value of the offspring is
hVCDr (x , 0)p (1 h)V  x . (B3)CD M CD ML M
Here, h controls the effect of reserves on the young’s value. If , then the male’s reserves do not affect the young’shp 0
value, while if , his reserves fully influence the offspring’s value (hence offspring cared for only by a male withhp 1
reserves close to zero have close to zero survival expectation). The maximal reserves with which a male can finish care
are given by . The value of care by a male with reserves caring alone is given by VCD. The valueL p L x (D) LM c, M M
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of female-only care is similarly defined. If both parents care and both are alive at the end of the period of care, then
the offspring’s value is
1 [ ]r (x , x )p a (x ) b (x )x  a (x ) b (x )x , (B4)CC M F M F M F M F M F M F2
where
x Fa (x )p hV  (1 h)V , (B5)M F DC CCL F
and
h x Fb (x )p V  (V  V  V ) . (B6)M F CD CC CD DC[ ]L LM F
The values of and are defined by similar equations. In these equations, h also controls the effect ofa (x ) b (x )F M F M
reserves on the young’s value. If , then the parents’ reserves do not affect the young’s value, while if , thehp 0 hp 1
parents’ reserves fully influence the offspring’s value. The maximal reserves with which a female can finish the care
are given by . The value of care by parents with maximum reserves and is VCD, VDC, and VCCL p L x (C) L LF c, F M F
in the cases of male-only, female-only, and biparental care, respectively.
The function defined by equation (B4) has the following properties. It gives higher offspring value for biparental
care unless and the reserves of the parent with higher V has stronger effect on the young’s valueV p V p VCC CD DC
than those of with lower V.
The effect of time of the season on the offspring value is represented by the following function:
vvt (T t)
1 1 when 0 ≤ t ! T( ) v v( )( )T (T t)  (T t)S(t)p (B7){
0 when t ≥ T.
The shape of this time-dependent function is controlled by two parameters: v gives the abruptness of the transition
from high brood value to low brood value (the larger v is, the more sudden the decrease), and t is the time at which
this transition occurs (Webb et al., in press). We use and in all of our computations.vp 2 tp 80
Solution of the Game
To solve the dynamic parental care game, we use the “errors in decision making” approach (McNamara et al. 1997).
Let UM(x, t) be the reproductive value of an unmated male with reserves x on day t. Let WM(x, y, t) be the reproductive
value of a mated male whose own reserves are x and whose mate’s reserves are y on day t, just after finishing offspring
production and about to decide on care. We assume that UM(0, t), (i.e., an animal with zero reservesW (0, y, t)p 0M
dies) and that (i.e., if the male’s mate dies during the offspring production, then no survivingW (x, 0, t)p U (x, t)M M
offspring are produced, and the male becomes unmated). We use
exp (x/d)
E(x)p (B8)
exp (x/d) 1
as an error function with as the extent of error.dp 0.015
Decision of an Unmated Animal. In this section, we give the equations for an unmated male; analogous notation is
used for unmated females. Let
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n
H (x, t)p PU {chop(x x  z ), t 1}, (B9)rest, M i M r, M i
ip0
n
H (x, t)p PU {chop(x x  z ), t 1}, (B10)forage, M i M f i
ip0
and
n L n n
′ ′′ ′′H (x, t)p [1 P (t)] PU {x , t 1} P (t) P (y, t)PPW {x , y , t t  1}, (B11) search, M M i M M search, F i j M l
ip0 yp1 ip0 jp0
where is defined by equation (A1), , , and′ ′′ ′′P (y, t) x p chop(x x  z ) x p chop(x x  z ) y psearch, F s, M i l, M i
.chop(y x  z )l, F j
Let , where a is either “rest,” “forage,” or “search,” andH (x, t)p max H (x, t) q (x, t)p E[H (x, t)max , M a a, M a, M a, M
, where E is given by equation (B8). ThenH (x, t)]max , M
q (x, t)a, M
p (x, t)p (B12)a, M q (x, t)a, M
a
gives the probability that the male with reserves x on day t performs action a. The value of pa, M(x, t) is also the best
response with error (cf. McNamara et al. 1997) of an unmated male. Then the unmated male’s reproductive value is
U (x, t)p p (x, t)H (x, t). (B13)M a, M a, M
a
Decisions of a Mated Female. Assume that a pair has finished the production of offspring at time t and that the male
has decided whether or not to desert. Let HAB, M(x, y, t) be the payoff of the desertion game for the male making a
decision at time t, while HAB, F(x, y, t) is the payoff for the female. The variables x and y denote the energy reserves
of the focal animal and its partner, respectively. The caring decision of the pair is given by AB (see above). Let
throughout. If the male deserts, then the expected reproductive value of the female if she cares is′t p t t  1c
n
′ ′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p P{R (0, x , t ) U (x , t )}, (B14)DC, F i DC F
ip0
where . The reproductive value of a deserting female is′x p chop[x x (D) z ]c, F i
n
H (x, y, t)p PU {chop(x x  z ), t 1} (B15)DD, F i F d i
ip0
because . Using the error function, we get that the probability of female desertion given that her maleR (x, y, t)p 0DD
deserts is
p (x, y, t)p E[H (x, y, t)H (x, y, t)]. (B16)desert, F(D) DD, F DC, F
Similarly, if the male cares,
n n
′ ′ ′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p PP{R (y , x , t ) U (x , t )}, (B17)CC, F i j CC F
ip0 jp0
where , and . If the male cares but the female deserts,′ ′x p chop[x x (C) z ] y p chop[y x (C) z ]c, F i c, M j
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n n
′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p PP{R (y , 0, t ) U (x , t 1)}, (B18)CD, F i j CD F
ip0 jp0
where , and . The probability that the female deserts, given her′ ′x p chop(x x  z ) y p chop[y x (D) z ]d i c, M j
mate cares, is then
p (x, y, t)p E[H (x, y, t)H (x, y, t)]. (B19)desert, F(C) CD, F CC, F
Similarly to the case of unmated individuals, pdesert, F(A)(x, y, t) also gives the best response of a mated female.
Decision of a Mated Male. Let the male decide on desertion at time t. As before, let . Then′t p t t  1c
n n
′ ′ ′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p PP{R (x , y , t ) U (x , t )}, (B20)CC, M i j CC M
ip0 jp0
where , ;′ ′x p chop[x x (C) z ] y p chop[y x (C) z ]c, M i c, F j
n
′ ′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p P{R (x , 0, t ) U (x , t )}, (B21)CD, M i CD M
ip0
where ;′x p chop[x x (D) z ]c, M i
n n
′ ′ ′H (x, y, t)p PP{R (0, y , t ) U (x , t 1)}, (B22)DC, M i j DC M
ip0 jp0
where , and ; and′ ′x p chop(x x  z ) y p chop[y x (D) z ]d i c, F j
n
H (x, y, t)p PU {chop(x x  z ), t 1}. (B23)DD, M i M d i
ip0
Let and , then the expected reproductive value for the male if heb (C)p p (x, y, t) b (D)p p (x, y, t)F desert, F(C) F desert, F(D)
cares is
W (C)p [1 b (C)]H (x, y, t) b (C)H (x, y, t), (B24)M F CC, M F CD, M
and the expected reproductive value if he deserts is
W (D)p [1 b (D)]H (x, y, t) b (D)H (x, y, t). (B25)M F DC, M F DD, M
Thus, the male deserts with probability
b p p (x, y, t)p E[W (D)W (C)], (B26)M desert, M M M
which also gives his best response with error.
Payoff of the Desertion Game. Given the above reproductive values and probabilities, the expected reproductive value
of a paired male on finishing offspring production at time t is
W (x, y, t)p (1 b )W (C) b W (D), (B27)M M M M M
whereas for a female on the same occasion it is
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W (x, y, t)p (1 b ){[1 b (C)]H (x, y, t) b (C)H (x, y, t)}F M F CC, F F CD, F
 b {[1 b (D)]H (x, y, t) b (D)H (x, y, t)}. (B28)M F DC, F F DD, F
The above equations are solved by working backward from the final time when
U (x, T)p R (x), (B29)M T
where RT(x) may represent the dependence of overwinter survival on energy reserves at the beginning of the winter.
We assume RT(x) will be the same for both sexes. In the computations, RT(x) was represented by a threshold function
1 if x 1 xLR (x)p , (B30)T {0 if x ≤ xL
where .x p 0L
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